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The General Accounting Office's Access to
Government Contractors' Records
The federal government spends over one hundred billion dol-
lars every year through an extensive system of military and civilian
procurement.' The General Accounting Office (the "GAO"),
headed by the Comptroller General, was established in 1921 as an
independent agency within the legislative branch2 and is responsi-
ble for overseeing and improving the procurement process.3 Fed-
eral law requires that each negotiated procurement contract4 con-
In Fiscal Year 1980, reported federal government procurement (excluding in-
tragovernment arrangements) totaled $73.5 billion for Defense Department procurement,
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PRIME CONTRACT AWARDS,
FIRST HALF FISCAL YEAR 1981, at 6-25 (1981) (Table 15), and $27.9 billion for procurement
by civilian agencies, GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION, PROCUREMENT BY CIVILIAN AGEN-
CIES FOR THE PERIOD OCT. 1, 1979 TO SEPT. 30, 1980 (pt. 1), at 1 (1981).
The manpower requirements of the procurement system are also considerable, engaging
the services of about 60,000 federal employees. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, AN ORGANIZED
APPROACH TO IMPROVING FEDERAL PROCUREMENT AND ACQUISITION PRACTICES 1 (1977).
Budget and Accounting Act, ch. 18, § 301, 42 Stat. 20, 23 (1921) (codified at 31 U.S.C.
§ 41 (1976)). See also Cibinic & Lasken, The Comptroller General and Government Con-
tracts, 38 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 349, 349 & nn.2-3 (1970). Although most independent agen-
cies are part of the executive branch, the GAO was established specifically to provide Con-
gress, not the President, with information about the government's financial activities.
Furthermore, the Comptroller General reports to Congress and may be removed from office
only for cause and only by joint resolution of Congress. See id. at 349-50. This unique status
has led some to conclude that the GAO "operat[es] on the hazy borderline between legisla-
tive and executive powers." Id. at 350.
3 See 31 U.S.C. § 53(a) (1976) ("The Comptroller General shall investigate ... all mat-
ters relating to the receipt, disbursement, and application of public funds... [and] he shall
make recommendations looking to greater economy or efficiency in public expenditures.").
4 Government procurement takes two forms: formal solicitation of bids (advertised pro-
curement) and procurement by negotiation. 10 U.S.C. § 2304(a) (1976) (defense procure-
ment); 41 U.S.C. § 5 (1976) (civilian procurement). In the case of advertised procurement,
the agency formally advertises the availability of a contract and solicits secret bids on a
competitive basis. When procuring by negotiation, the agency negotiates terms with one or
more prospective contractor and awards the contract to the party offering the most advanta-
geous terms. Nash, Risk Allocation in Government Contracts, 34 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 693,
694 nn.2-3 (1966); Case Comment, The Comptroller General's Authority to Examine the
Private Business Records of Government Contractors: Eli Lilly & Co. v. Staats, 92 HARV. L.
REV. 1148, 1148 n.1 (1979).
Procurement by advertising is preferred by law, see 10 U.S.C. § 2304(a) (1976) (adver-
tising to be used "in all cases in which the use of such method is feasible and practicable");
41 U.S.C. § 5 (1976) (advertising to be used "unless otherwise provided"), and has been
described as the "usual method" of government procurement, 1B J. McBRIDE & T. TOUHEY,
GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS § 9.10[1] (1981). Negotiation may be used only when specified by
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tan a clause granting the Comptroller General the right to inspect
all records "directly pertinent" to the contract.5 Neither the stat-
ute nor the legislative history, however, defines "directly perti-
nent," leaving the scope of the Comptroller General's inspection
powers unclear.
statute. 41 U.S.C. § 5 (1976). For examples of provisions specifying procurement by negotia-
tion, see 10 U.S.C. § 2304(a) (1976) (defense procurement by negotiation allowed when the
dollar amount involved does not exceed $10,000, when there is only one source of supply, or
when public exigencies require immediate performance); 41 U.S.C. § 5 (1976) (same for ci-
vilian procurement). Procurement by negotiation is not insignificant. it constitutes about
three-fourths of all government procurement contracts. Nash, supra, at 694 n.3. In Fiscal
Year 1980, the total dollar amount involved in negotiated procurement reached almost $89
billion. See GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION, supra note 1, at 1; OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE, supra note 1, at 6-25 (Table 15).
5 The civilian procurement statute provides that
[a]ll contracts negotiated without advertising. . . shall include a clause to the effect
that the Comptroller General of the United States or any of his duly authorized repre-
sentatives shall until the expiration of three years after final payment have access to
and the right to examine any directly pertinent books, documents, papers, and records
of the contractor or any of his subcontractors engaged in the performance of and in-
volving transactions related to such contracts or subcontracts.
41 U.S.C. § 254(c) (1976). The defense counterpart provides that
[e]ach contract negotiated under this chapter shall provide that the Comptroller Gen-
eral and his representatives are entitled, until the expiration of three years after final
payment, to examine any books, documents, papers, or records of the contractor, or any
of his subcontractors, that directly pertain to, and involve transactions relating to, the
contract or subcontract.
10 U.S.C. § 2313(b) (1976).
The two statutes, though now worded differently, have the same meaning. See MACHIN-
ERY AND ALLIED PRODUCTS INSTITUTE AND COUNCIL FOR TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCEMENT, THE
GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR AND THE GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE 92-93 & n.13 (1966). Refer-
ences herein to a single statute are applicable to both unless otherwise specified.
6 One might characterize GAO inspection of corporate records as a search and, as such,
limited by the fourth amendment's prohibition of unreasonable searches and its require-
ment of search warrants based upon probable cause. See U.S. CONsT. amend. IV. Even if the
inspections are in fact searches, however, they do not violate the fourth amendment. Each
contractor consents by contract to allow inspection, and he thereby waives his constitutional
rights. But because such consent is a prerequisite to doing business with the government, it
may constitute an unconstitutional condition; by placing a condition on selling to the gov-
ernment, the government may not do indirectly (conduct an unreasonable or warrantless
search) what it is prohibited from doing directly. See, e.g., Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S.
593, 597 (1972); see also Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 83-84 (1973) (doctrine of uncon-
stitutional conditions applies to relations with government contractors). Even as direct
searches, however, the inspection statutes are probably unobjectionable. In Donovan v.
Dewey, 452 U.S. 594 (1981), the Supreme Court indicated that the fourth amendment inter-
ests of a commercial enterprise "may. . . be adequately protected by regulatory schemes
authorizing warrantless inspections." Id. at 599 (citation omitted). To satisfy the constitu-
tion, such regulatory schemes must be authorized by law or be necessary for the furtherance
of a federal interest, and they must not require unpredictable intrusions. See id. GAO in-
spection of corporate records is authorized explicitly by statute, 10 U.S.C. § 2313(b) (1976);
41 U.S.C. § 254(c) (1976), furthers the government's interest in the efficient use of tax reve-
nues, see infra notes 38-42 and accompanying text, and, because the contractor agrees to
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There has been little litigation over GAO access to records,
but the few cases on point have reached inconsistent results. In
particular, two opposing definitions have emerged in a series of
cases involving drug manufacturers, 7 and the issue will soon be ad-
dressed by the Supreme Court." The dispute centers on records of
costs, such as research and development, marketing, and general
administrative costs, that the manufacturers do not allocate to any
particular product or contract:9 must relevant but unallocated cost
data be disclosed? All courts addressing the issue have ordered dis-
closure of some such data. Yet the majority test, though not clearly
articulated in these terms, appears for the most part to limit GAO
inquiry to allocated cost data and to withhold unallocated cost
provide access to its records for only three years after the last payment under the contract,
is predictable.
A constitutional objection to GAO inspection has been raised in only one case, and it
was rejected because the inspection was reasonably related to an investigation within the
GAO's jurisdiction. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Staats, 574 F.2d 904, 917 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 959 (1978). See Morgan, The General Accounting Office: One Hope for Congress to
Regain Parity of Power with the President, 51 N.C.L. REv. 1279, 1362 (1973) (government
contractors have "no constitutional protection" against disclosure of records to the GAO).
Compare SmithKline Corp. v. Staats, 668 F.2d 201, 213 (3d Cir. 1981) ("directly per-
tinent" records primarily are those concerning "direct" (i.e., allocated) costs), petition for
cert. filed sub nom. Bowsher v. SmithKline Corp., 50 U.S.L.W. 3936 (U.S. May 10, 1982)
(No. 81-2082) and Merck & Co. v. Staats, 665 F.2d 1236, 1237 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (same), cert.
granted sub nom. Bowsher v. Merck & Co., 102 S. Ct. 1968 (1982) and Bristol Laboratories
Div. of Bristol-Myers Co. v. Staats, 620 F.2d 17, 18 (2d Cir. 1980) (same), affd mem. by an
evenly divided court, 451 U.S. 400 (1981) with United States v. Abbott Laboratories, 597
F.2d 672, 674 (7th Cir. 1979) ("directly pertinent" records are all those concerning "'signifi-
cant inputs'" (quoting Ely Lilly & Co. v. Staats, 574 F.2d 904, 914-15 (7th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 439 U.S. 959 (1978))) and Eli Lilly & Co. v. Staats, 574 F.2d 904, 914-15 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 959 (1978). The Lilly formulation was adopted by Judge Mikva in his
separate opinion in Merck & Co. v. Staats, 665 F.2d at 1237-50 (Mikva, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part).
8 Certiorari was granted in Bowsher v. Merck & Co., 102 S. Ct. 1968 (1982), and a
petition for certiorari is pending in Bowsher v. SmithKline Corp., 50 U.S.L.W. 3936 (U.S.
May 10, 1982) (No. 81-2082).
The issue was before the Court two years ago, Staats v. Bristol Laboratories Div. of
Bristol-Myers Co., 451 U.S. 400 (1981) (Stewart, J., not participating), affg mem. by an
evenly divided court 620 F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1980) (adhering to direct cost test), but because
the Court was evenly divided, its decision has no precedential force, see Neil v. Biggers, 409
U.S. 188, 192 (1972).
1 See supra note 7. Costs incurred to develop or sell a particular product, such as raw
material costs, are considered "allocated." Costs relating to several products, such as the
costs of research to develop technology used in many product lines, are considered "unallo-
cated." See Bristol Laboratories Div. of Bristol-Myers Co. v. Staats, 428 F. Supp. 1388,
1389-91 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd per curiam, 620 F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1980), aff'd mem. by an
evenly divided court, 451 U.S. 400 (1981). All courts agree that the GAO may obtain records
concerning costs that have been allocated to products the government has purchased, and
all agree that the GAO may not inspect records of unallocated costs that are not relevant to
the costs of a government contract.
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data from GAO scrutiny.10 The minority test would allow the GAO
to inspect records of any costs, allocated or not, if the costs were
"significant inputs" in the government's contract price.11
This comment will evaluate the competing interpretations of
"directly pertinent" by examining the language, history, and pur-
10 See, e.g., Bristol Laboratories, 428 F. Supp. at 1389-90, 1391. Bristol allowed the
GAO access to records of manufacturing costs (including raw and packaging materials, labor
and fringe benefits, quality control and supervision), manufacturing overhead (including
plant administration, production planning, warehousing, utilities, and security), royalty ex-
penses, and delivery costs. The court denied access to records pertaining to the costs of
research and development, marketing and promotion, and distribution and administration
(except as included in the records to which access was granted). Id.
Bristol's decision as to which cost data to disclose and which to withhold was not based
on whether the costs were allocated. The court did make available some unallocated data,
and it conceded that the manufacturer's failure to allocate a cost should not determine
whether the GAO may inspect records concerning the cost, but the court did not explain
how the data it made available differed from the data it withheld: because the court found
the GAO's alternative unacceptable, it granted the GAO access only to the data that Bristol
Laboratories was willing to make available. Id. at 1391. Later courts adhering to the major-
ity view have permitted GAO inspection of the same cost categories made available in Bris-
tol without further explanation and without regard to the cost allocations of the manufac-
turer involved. See, e.g., SmithKline, 668 F.2d at 212-13.
It may not be obvious, therefore, why one should distinguish the majority position as
one following an allocated/unallocated breakdown, but there is good reason to do so. Bristol
Laboratories and the Bristol court apparently assumed at the outset that Bristol must open
to the GAO records concerning at least the costs Bristol allocated to particular products
(labeled "direct" costs). They then added a few other cost categories without explanation.
See Bristol, 428 F. Supp. at 1391. The most recent court to follow Bristol has said that "the
standard formulated in Bristol. . .for the most part relies on the distinction between di-
rect and indirect costs." SmithKline, 668 F.2d at 213. Moreover, Bristol's adding the few
unallocated cost categories could not have enlarged the GAO's access rights much, for the
data released by the court left 91% of the drugs' costs unexplained. See Rucker, Public
Policy Considerations and the Pricing of Prescription Drugs in the United States, 4 INT'L
J. HEALTH SERVICES 171, 173 (1974) ("indirect factors, such as research and development,
promotion, general administrative expense, taxes, and profit," consume a median of 91% of
drug companies' revenues). It appears, therefore, that at least in the drug industry the Bris-
tol test is the functional equivalent of one that discloses only allocated costs. See Merck &
Co., 665 F.2d at 1246 n.24 (Mikva, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) ("Th[e] frame-
work [of the direct/indirect distinction] appears to correspond to Merck's distinction be-
tween its 'allocated' and 'unallocated' costs."). Because there is so little to distinguish Bris-
tol's test from an allocated/unallocated standard, and because there is so little else that
describes the majority's position, this comment will discuss the Bristol test as based on an
allocated/unallocated distinction.
There is also a practical reason for identifying the majority position in this manner.
Because the statute speaks in terms of "directly pertinent" records, Bristol's disclosure of
"direct" cost data tends to prejudge the issue: access to "direct" costs should be all the
statute requires. "The similarity of these phrases, though seductive, cannot substitute for
analysis." Merck & Co., 665 F.2d at 1247 (Mikva, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
Use of the allocated/unallocated formulation will avoid any such temptation and will pro-
mote reasoned analysis.
1 Eli Lilly & Co. v. Staats, 574 F.2d 904, 914-15 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 959
(1978).
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poses of the statute and by considering several policy concerns.
The comment concludes that the "significant inputs" interpreta-
tion is truer to the goals of the statute, but that the access proce-
dures would be improved if the GAO included in standard govern-
ment contracts more specific information about the records to
which it expects access.
I. BACKGROUND
Beginning in 1967 and continuing into the early 1970's, a sub-
committee of the Senate Select Committee on Small Business con-
ducted a far-ranging study of profits and competition in the drug
industry." It was suggested that the GAO access-to-records statute
be used to assist the investigation.13 In 1974, the GAO attempted
to invoke the provisions to obtain cost data from pharmaceutical
companies that had government contracts.1 4 Although initially co-
operative, five of the six companies targeted for study eventually
rejected all or part of the GAO requests. 15 A flurry of litigation
ensued in which the "allocated/unallocated" and "significant in-
puts" tests arose.16
The differences between the two tests are especially acute in
the drug cases because only a small portion, perhaps as little as
nine percent, of the costs of pharmaceuticals are traceable to allo-
12 See Competitive Problems in the Drug Industry: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Monopoly of the Senate Select Comm. on Small Business (pt. 1), 90th Cong., 1st Sess.
passim (1967). In addition to examining government procurement of drugs, these hearings
studied diverse topics ranging from oral contraceptives and psychotropic drugs to drug com-
pany practices in labeling and promoting prescription drugs sold in Latin America. Id. The
goal of the hearings was to develop "an objective and useful record that will serve as a
source of information to Congress in the event legislation is indicated." Id. at 1 (remarks of
Sen. Nelson).
" Competitive Problems in the Drug Industry: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Mo-
nopoly of the Senate Select Comm. on Small Business (pt. 20), 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 8020
(1971) (statement of Sen. Nelson) ("I realize it may be a very complicated matter, but it
would seem to me that all companies ought to be served notice that the GAO is going to
utilize this [1951 access-to-records] statute. I think we ought to take a look at some of these
costs."). See generally Eli Lilly & Co. v. Staats, 574 F.2d 904, 921-22 (7th Cir.) (reprinting
district court's findings of fact concerning negotiations about drug investigation between the
GAO and the subcommittee staff), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 959 (1978); Note, Eli Lilly & Co. v.
Staats: An Undue Expansion of the GAO's Investigatory Power under the Access-to-
Records Statutes, 74 Nw. U.L. REv. 122, 124-25 (1979).
14 SmithKline Corp. v. Stats, 668 F.2d 201, 203 (3d Cir. 1981), petition for cert. filed
sub nom. Bowsher v. SmithKline Corp., 50 U.S.L.W. 3936 (U.S. May 10, 1982) (No. 81-
2082).
1" The sixth company settled with the GAO. Case Comment, supra note 4, at 1150 n.12.
" See supra notes 7-10 and accompanying text.
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cated costs. 17 In arriving at the different tests, the courts have em-
phasized this fact and two competing legislative concerns. The ac-
cess-to-records statute was enacted to assist the study and
improvement of government procurement practices;" at the same
time, Congress was concerned that the GAO not be given a license
to engage in "snooping." 19 The courts favoring the significant in-
puts test argue that if the government is allowed to inspect data
for only the allocated nine percent of a product's cost, no meaning-
ful procurement study will be possible.20 Conversely, the courts
that limit the GAO to inspection of allocated costs argue that if
the statute is construed to require GAO access to data on the re-
maining ninety-one percent of costs, then virtually all aspects of
the manufacturer's operations are open to the GAO, which would
allow exactly the sort of "snooping" that Congress meant to
forbid.21
The dominance of unallocated costs in the pharmaceuticals in-
dustry apparently makes the industry unusual.2 Other industries
with high research and development expenditures, a major portion
of the unallocated costs in the drug industry, 3 also sell their prod-
ucts to the government. The nature of government procurement
1, Eli Lilly & Co. v. Staats, 574 F.2d at 913 (citing Rucker, supra note 10, at 173). See
supra note 10.
8 See infra notes 57-65 and accompanying text.
"See infra notes 71-78 and accompanying text.
10 United States v. Abbott Laboratories, 597 F.2d 672, 674 & n.1 (7th Cir. 1979); Eli
Lilly & Co. v. Staats, 574 F.2d at 913-14. See Merck & Co. v. Staats, 665 F.2d 1236, 1247
(D.C. Cir. 1981) (Mikva, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part), cert. granted sub nom.
Bowsher v. Merck & Co., 102 S. Ct. 1968 (1982).
11 E.g., Bristol Laboratories Div. of Bristol-Myers Co. v. Staats, 428 F. Supp. 1388, 1390
(S.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd per curiam, 620 F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1980), aff'd mem. by an evenly di-
vided court, 451 U.S. 400 (1981).
'2 See SmithKline Corp. v. Staats, 668 F.2d at 214 ("the pharmaceutical industry
presents special characteristics"); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Staats, 574 F.2d at 913-14 (unlike in
other industries, "research and other costs not immediately attributable to one product
form such a large portion of the costs of a pharmaceutical product that their import to...
[the government] contract seems inescapable"). See also GENmA ACCOUNTING OFFICE, Gov-
ERNMENT CONTRACT PRINcn'LEs 4-26 (3d ed. 1980) ("It should be noted also that unallocated
overhead items are limited to industries, such as the pharmaceutical industry, in which such
costs constitute a large portion of the total cost of supplying the item.").
23 Detailed industry-by-industry data on the allocation of costs are not available. The
relation of one allocated cost of production (the cost of raw materials, see Bristol Laborato-
ries, 428 F. Supp. at 1389) to the value of the various products provides the basis for a
rough comparison. Such a comparison, using census data, is presented below. Although "cost
of materials" as defined by the Census Bureau may include some unallocated costs and may
not include some costs that are allocated, the records made available under the Bristol stan-
dard also related to some unallocated costs, see supra note 10. Moreover, there is no reason
to assume that any distortions in the census data would affect the pharmaceutical industry
disproportionately. A sampling of these data from 1977 reveals the following ratios:
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practices in those industries, however, tends not to create access-
to-records disputes.24 In most other industries with which the gov-
Industry/Product Category
Pharmaceutical Preparations
Biological Products
Synthetic Rubber
Petroleum & Coal Products
Small Arms Ammunition
Ordnance & Accessories
Office Machines & Typewriters
Motor Vehicles & Car Bodies
Aircraft
Aircraft Engines & Engine Parts
Guided Missiles & Space Vehicles
Shipbuilding & Repairing
Tanks & Tank Components
Engineering & Scientific Instruments
Cost of Materials (ncl. fuel) as
Percentage of Value of Shipments
29.6
39.0
69.5
83.8
42.0
31.7
39.6
76.0
45.5
44.0
31.8
41.1
63.2
35.4
SOURCE: DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, 1977 CENSUS OF MANUFACTURERS 7-5 to 8-7 (1981) (Ta-
ble 2, Selected Statistics for Operating Manufacturing Establishments by Type of Operation
and Legal Form of Organization, for Major Industry Groups and Industries: 1977).
A 1980 survey of industry research and development (nongovernment-funded) as a per-
centage of sales reveals the following:
Industry Group Private R & D Spending
Drugs (ethical & proprietary; medical supplies)
Aerospace (airframes, general aircraft, parts)
Appliances
Automotive (cars, trucks)
(parts, equipment)
Electrical
Electronics
Food, Beverages
General Machinery (machine tools, industrial
machinery, mining equipment)
Instruments (measuring devices, controls)
Natural Resources (oil service, supply)
Information Processing (computers)
(office equipment)
Telecommunications
Textiles, Apparel
Tires & Rubber
Industry Composite
as Percentage of Sales
4.9
4.5
SOURCE: Spending for Research Still Outpaces Inflation, Bus. WK., July 6, 1981 at 61-75
(table entitled "R & D Scoreboard, 1980"). See also F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUC-
TURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 410 (2d ed. 1980); NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION, RE-
SEARCH & DEVELOPMENT IN INDUSTRY, FEBRUARY, 1978, at 10 (Table B-2), 22 (Table B-18)
(1981).
2 First, some contracts in these fields would be competitively bid rather than negoti-
ated, and thus the access-to-records statute would not apply. See supra note 4. Second,
although the statute applies to all negotiated contracts, it is controversial only with respect
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ernment has negotiated procurement contracts, the portion of the
product's price represented by allocated costs is larger than in the
pharmaceutical industry 2 5 As the portion represented by allocated
costs increases, the difference between the allocated/unallocated
test and the significant inputs test tends to disappear.
Although there is reason to believe that the pharmaceutical
litigation is unusual, the choice between the allocated/unallocated
test and the significant inputs test is still important for two rea-
sons. First, the dispute is important in its own right: drug
purchases represent a significant portion of all government pro-
curement, approaching one billion dollars annually.2" Second, al-
though the two tests tend to converge where, as in most industries,
allocated costs encompass a greater portion of all costs, the tests
do not necessarily overlap. There may be instances where indus-
tries would not object to government inspection of data concerning
unallocated costs or where courts would order such records pro-
duced if the test were "significant inputs. 2 7 If the Supreme Court
adopts the allocated/unallocated test,2 8 even though the statute
does not require such a narrow reading, the government may be
to negotiated "fixed-price" contracts. For those contracts in which the contractor's payment
is cost-based (e.g., a cost-plus-fixed-fee arrangement), the incentive is upon the contractor
to disclose the maximum amount of cost information to ensure complete reimbursement
these contractors will attempt to allocate all costs to their contract items. Accordingly, the
choice between the significant inputs and allocated/unallocated tests is irrelevant to the
cost-based contracts that predominate in the other industries with high research and devel-
opment costs. In these high technology fields, costs tend to be volatile, thus making it hard
for either party to predict the costs in advance. Cost-based contracts are a logical response
because they insure that neither party will be disproportionately affected by drastic market
changes. See generally GENERAL AcCOUSrINo OFFIcE, supra note 22, at 4-21 to 4-24 (listing
of various fixed-price and cost-based contract variations used by the government).
15 See generally supra notes 22-23.
21 Merck & Co. v. Staats, 665 F.2d 1236, 1247 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (Mikva, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part), cert. granted sub nom. Bowsher v. Merck & Co., 102 S. Ct. 1968
(1982). This represents nearly one percent of total federal procurement. See supra note 1
and accompanying text.
V The only case litigated under the access-to-records statutes, other than the pharma-
ceutical industry cases, is Hewlett-Packard Co. v. United States, 385 F.2d 1013 (9th Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 988 (1968). This dearth of litigation suggests that most govern-
ment contractors are willing to allow the GAO substantially greater access to their records
than are the drug companies, although it is also possible that the GAO does not often in-
voke the statutes.
2S Although the test adopted in Bristol did not adhere completely to an allocated/unal-
located breakdown, the Court could rule in favor of an allocated/unallocated test because
one issue presented by the GAO in its petition for certiorari is whether "costs ... not allo-
cated by contract... for] product basis" may be inspected by the government. Bowsher v.
Merck & Co., 50 U.S.L.W. 3774 (U.S. Mar. 23, 1982) (No. 81-1273) (summary of cert.
petition).
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excluded unnecessarily from data that could help it improve the
way it spends public funds.
II. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
GAO access to contractor records is based upon a clause in
procurement contracts, but the clause exists because it is required
by statute.2" In seeking to fix the meaning of "directly pertinent,"30
therefore, one should look to the intent of the enacting Congress
and not to the contracting parties' intent.31 Unfortunately, the lan-
guage and history of the access-to-records statute provide little ev-
idence of the meaning of those two words.
The initial impetus for the legislation was congressional con-
cern over possible fraud in the renegotiation of government con-
tracts during the Korean War.2 The pharmaceutical companies
have claimed 33 that the sole purpose of the legislation was to de-
tect fraud in negotiations 4 and that "directly pertinent" relates
29 See 10 U.S.C. § 2313(b) (1976); 41 U.S.C. § 254(c) (1976).
30 See supra note 5.
3, Merck & Co. v. Staats, 665 F.2d at 1248 & n.28 (Mikva, J., concurring in part, dis-
senting in part); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Staats, 574 F.2d 904, 918 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
959 (1978). But see Bristol Laboratories Div. of Bristol-Myers Co. v. Staats, 428 F. Supp.
1388, 1390-91 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (following intent of contracting parties), aff'd per curiam, 620
F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1980), afl'd mem. by an evenly divided court, 451 U.S. 400 (1981).
3" See Merck & Co. v. Staats, 665 F.2d at 1243 (Mikva, J., concurring in part, dissenting
in part). The combination of severe inflation and increased demand for materials caused by
the war placed tremendous strains on many companies performing under fixed-price govern-
ment contracts. See generally id. To alleviate these pressures, Congress gave the President
temporary authority to renegotiate government contracts. Act of Jan. 12, 1951, ch. 1230, 64
Stat. 1257 (expired by own terms). The access-to-records provisions were initially included
as part of this emergency legislation in order to provide a check on the renegotiation pro-
cess. See 96 CONG. REC. 17,123 (1951) (remarks of Rep. Celler) (access provision likened to
"a Damoclean sword that will hang over the heads of the contractors whose contracts are
changed").
Although the initial access-to-records legislation, along with the renegotiation authority,
was of limited duration, Congress soon passed a permanent version of this legislation. See
Act of Oct. 31, 1951, Pub. L. No. 245, 65 Stat. 700 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 2313(b) (1976), 41
U.S.C. § 254(c) (1976)). Representative Hardy, the sponsor of both the temporary and per-
manent legislation, noted that the provision for GAO access to records was designed not
solely to prevent fraud, but also to help safeguard against unfairness due to a perceived
advantage in bargaining power of contractors over government procurement agents. 97
CONG. REC. 13,198 (1951) (remarks of Rep. Hardy) (constructing scenario of an experienced
contractor negotiating with a less accomplished government representative, with the govern-
ment coming out "on the short end of the deal").
33 See SmithKline Corp. v. Steats, 668 F.2d 201, 204-05 (3d Cir. 1981), petition for cert.
filed sub noma. Bowsher v. SmithKline Corp., 50 U.S.L.W. 3936 (U.S. May 10, 1982) (No. 81-
2082); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Staats, 574 F.2d at 915.
1, A similar argument was made by analogy to the Truth-in-Negotiations Act of 1962,
10 U.S.C. § 2306 (1976), and the Renegotiation Act of 1951, 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1211-1233
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only to records actually relied upon in negotiating contract
prices.35
(1976). The Truth-in-Negotiations Act, for example, provides as follows:
For the purpose of evaluating the accuracy, completeness, and currency of cost or pric-
ing data required to be submitted by this subsection, any authorized representative of
the [government agency] shall have the right, until the expiration of three years after
final payment ... to examine all books, records, documents, and other data of the
contractor or subcontractor related to the negotiation, pricing, or performance of the
contract or subcontract.
10 U.S.C. § 2306(0(4) (1976) (applicable only to military procurement). See also 41 C.F.R.
§§ 1-3.807 to 1-3.807-1.2 (1981) (similar regulations governing civilian procurement). Both
the Truth-in-Negotiations Act and the Renegotiation Act contain exemptions for contracts
whose subjects are standard commercial items with prices based on standard catalogue
prices. 10 U.S.C. § 2306(0 (1976); 50 U.S.C. app. § 1216(e) (1976). The drug companies have
argued that this exemption should be read into the 1951 statute to exempt them from GAO
inspection: their contracts' prices are based on catalogue prices. See, e.g., Eli Lilly & Co. v.
Staats, 574 F.2d at 916.
The courts uniformly have rejected this contention. First, they note that the other stat-
utes serve a more limited purpose than the 1951 access-to-records statute because those
statutes are concerned with pricing, largely fraudulent pricing, during the negotiation pro-
cess. The courts then conclude that the absence of an explicit standard commercial goods
exemption in the 1951 statute shows that Congress did not intend to limit the access-to-
records law in that manner. See SmithKline Corp. v. Staats, 668 F.2d at 208; Merck & Co. v.
Staats, 665 F.2d at 1244-45 (Mikva, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); Eli Lilly &
Co. v. Staats, 574 F.2d at 916. See also Hewlett-Packard Co. v. United States, 385 F.2d
1013, 1016 (9th Cir. 1967) (arguing that if Congress had intended to limit the application of
the access statute, it would have done so explicitly), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 988 (1968).
Indeed, the scope of GAO access allowed under these statutes suggests that Congress
intended the 1951 statute to have a broad sweep. The Truth-in-Negotiations Act and the
Renegotiation Act are conceded to have the narrower purpose of preventing waste and fraud
in negotiations. Under the Truth-in-Negotiations Act, the government is allowed access to
pricing data whenever there is a "logical nexus" between the data and the possibility of a
lower negotiated contract price. Sylvania Elec. Prods., Inc. v. United States, 479 F.2d 1342,
1348 (Ct. Cl. 1973). See GENERkL AccoUNTING OFFICE, supra note 22, at 4-20 (contractors
must disclose "all facts reasonably available to the contractor up to the time of agreement
which might reasonably be expected to have a significant effect on the price negotiation"). If
the more narrow statute allows greater access to records than the allocated/unallocated test
would under the broader 1951 statute, one suspects that the allocated/unallocated test may
be too restrictive. Although the 1951 statute is limited in some fashion by the "directly
pertinent" language, it would confound the statutory scheme to allow less access to records
under a statute designed to serve broader purposes.
11 None of the costs of the contract were negotiated; the contract prices are based on
catalogue prices. See SmithKline Corp. v. Staats, 668 F.2d at 208; Eli Lilly & Co. v. Staats,
574 F.2d at 907; Shnitzer, The Comptroller General's Right of Access to Contactors'
Records-The Hewlett-Packard Case, 2 PuB. CONT. L.J. 298, 299 (1969) (noting that all
items purchased in Hewlett-Packard had been or were soon listed in the company's cata-
logue). Because the costs were not the subject of negotiations, the contractors have argued
that they are not directly pertinent. The courts have all rejected this contention. See infra
note 36 and accompanying text. It is worth noting, however, that the only case decided
under the access-to-records statute before the pharmaceuticals litigation had established the
precise point: although a contract's prices are established solely on the basis of catalogue
prices, the GAO is allowed to inspect records pertinent to "the general subject matter,"
which in the case of procurement contracts is "the procurement of described property by
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The courts uniformly have rejected this narrow reading of the
statute's purpose, 8 for the legislative history demonstrates that
the detection of fraud was only one of several concerns that in-
spired the statute. 7 Committee reports in both the House and
Senate called for "broad application" of the access-to-records pro-
vision.38 Representative Porter Hardy Jr., the sponsor of the bill,
stated that "there are a lot of other situations besides those involv-
ing fraud which might be uncovered" through use of the access-to-
records clause.39 The provision may also be used to deter waste
the Government." Hewlett-Packard Co. v. United States, 384 F.2d at 1016. Because of Hew-
lett-Packard, the pharmaceutical manufacturers did not argue that the GAO is excluded
from inspecting all records, but more generally that the anti-fraud purposes of the statute
require that the GAO be allowed access only to direct cost records. See supra notes 33-35
and accompanying text.
36 See SmithKline Corp. v. Staats, 668 F.2d at 205; Merck & Co. v. Staats, 665 F.2d at
1238-41 (Mikva, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Staats, 574 F.2d
at 910-11. The Supreme Court, however, has granted certiorari on the question whether
access is limited to those documents actually relied on by the contracting parties in negotia-
tions. Bowsher v. Merck & Co., 102 S. Ct. 1968 (1982) (granting cert.); id., 50 U.S.L.W. 3774
(U.S. Mar. 23, 1982) (No. 81-1472) (summary of cert. petition).
37 See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
33 H.R. REP. No. 791, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1951); S. REP. No. 603, 82d Cong., 1st Sess.
2 (1951). See generally United States v. Curtis-Nevada Mines, Inc., 611 F.2d 1277, 1280 n.1
(9th Cir. 1980) (courts interpreting ambiguous statutory provision may consider statements
of purpose in committee reports) (citing Commissioner v. Bilder, 369 U.S. 499 (1962)).
39 97 CONG. REc. 13,199 (1951) (remarks of Rep. Hardy). See generally Lewis v. United
States, 445 U.S. 55, 63 (1980) (court interpreting statute gives weight to sponsor's statement
of bill's purpose); Simpson v. United States, 435 U.S. 6, 13 (1978) (same).
In debate, Hardy cited several examples of potential uses of the clause. One case in-
volved an inefficient market structure in which a government agency purchased automotive
parts from a seller who bought from a distributor who in turn had bought from a tool shop.
Hardy denounced these "profits upon profits and completely wasteful administrative and
handling costs" and concluded that GAO detection of the situation would be "difficult, if
not impossible," without the access-to-records provision. 97 CONG. REc. at 13,198.
Another example was contractor abuse of contractual price-redetermination clauses.
Such a clause allows price adjustment during the course of contract performance. Hardy
noted that government contracting officers were sometimes lax in their scrutiny of these
adjustments, and he asserted that the "[k]nowledge that the GAO may later examine these
books and records cannot help but make for more careful operations" by these officers. Id.
Further, Hardy noted situations in which contractors holding both a fixed-price and a
cost-plus-fixed-fee contract had (intentionally or accidentally) reallocated some costs from
the fixed-price contract to the cost-plus contract, and thus maintained a profit margin on
both contracts. Hardy stated that this type of practice could go undetected without an ac-
cess-to-records provision. Id.
See also id. (remarks of Rep. Hardy) ("The major purposes of this bill are twofold: One,
to give the Comptroller General the proper tools to do the job the Congress has instructed
him to do; and two, to provide a deterrent to improprieties and wastefulness in the negotia-
tion of contracts."); Note, supra note 13, at 126 (research study connected with evaluation
of government procurement is a proper purpose for invoking provision). But see Casenote,
Government Contracts: Contractor's Obligation to Allow Examination of Records under 10
U.S.C. § 2313(b), 72 DICK. L. REV. 687, 691 (1968) (questioning the use of access-to-records
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and inefficiency on the part of contractors,4" to keep government
contracting officers on their guard for such practices," ' and to as-
sist the GAO generally in its goal of improving the procurement
process.42
Because the statute was intended to do more than simply help
detect fraud, the courts have not limited access to those records
actually relied upon in negotiations. The broad purposes of the
statute would be served by broad access to records." s The statute,
however, limits the Comptroller General's access to "directly perti-
nent" records. Although there is a substantial legislative history
documenting the general purpose for the access legislation, there is
very little to explain the import of "directly pertinent."
The only direct clue to the meaning of the phrase is a brief
discussion concerning a floor amendment. As originally introduced,
the access legislation would have permitted GAO inspection of all
"pertinent" records." The chief opponent of the bill, Representa-
tive Clare E. Hoffman, offered an amendment which altered the
wording to allow access to "directly pertinent" records.45 Hoffman
stated that the purpose of his amendment was "to limit the 'snoop-
ing' that may be carried on under this bill.' '1" Representative
clause for anything but detection of fraud).
40 97 CONG. REC. at 13,198 (remarks of Rep. Hardy). See also F. MOSHER, THE GAO:
THE QUEST FOR ACCOUNTABILITY IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 153-54 (1979) (noting GAO use
of access provision to police waste and congressional approval of that use).
41 97 CONG. REC. at 13,198 (remarks of Rep. Hardy).
42 See cases cited supra note 36.
43 For example, abuse of the price-redetermination clause, see supra note 39, would be
difficult to detect without broad access because the contractor could hide the improprieties
in some records held inaccessible. Similarly, the dual purpose of the bill-"to give the
Comptroller General the proper tools to do the job. . . and. . . to provide a deterrent," 97
CONG. REC. at 13,198-suggests that the "tool" was meant to be powerful, not timid. See
generally supra note 39.
4, See H.R. REP. No. 791, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1951); S. REP. No. 603, 82d Cong., 1st
Sess. 1 (1951).
43 See 97 CONG. REC. at 13,377. Examples of Hoffman's opposition to the bill may be
found throughout the House debate. See id. at 13,371-77.
16 Id. at 13,377. The full debate is set forth below:
Mr. HARDY: I personally have no objection to the amendment.
Mr. HOFFMAN of Michigan: I understand the other day when I discussed it with
the gentleman, that while this amendment was not all that it should be, it was the best
that he could think of. Certainly, it was the best-well, I was rather forced to accept it
and to agree with him. The purpose is to limit the "snooping" that may be carried on
under this bill which we do not have the votes to defeat.
Mr. HARDY: I have no objection to the amendment.
Mr. HOFFMAN of Michigan: In that case I will not argue.
The Chairman: The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from
Michigan [Mr. HOFFMAN].
The amendment was agreed to.
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Hardy, the bill's sponsor, did not oppose the amendment, and it
was adopted without further debate.47
The Hoffman amendment and its history do little to give af-
firmative content to "directly pertinent." All one can tell from the
Hoffman-Hardy colloquy is that Hoffman was against the bill, that
he was especially concerned with "snooping," and that Hardy was
willing to accept an amendment that would clarify that the bill was
not meant to be a license for government snooping. 8 There is no
further elucidation of what snooping the amendment would ex-
clude or which records "directly pertinent" might include. Because
of this ambiguity, courts must determine how the antisnooping
language should consist with the broader investigatory purposes of
the statute.
III. CONGRESSIONAL PURPOSES AND OTHER POLICY
CONSIDERATIONS
A. Internal Limitations
The access provisions apply only to negotiated contracts and
the GAO may inspect records for only three years after the final
payment under a contract.' 9 Moreover, the GAO's regulations ex-
empt procurement contracts totalling less than $10,000 from the
access provisions. 0 One court has suggested that these limitations
evince a congressional intent to limit the scope of GAO inquiries
and that limiting GAO access to allocated cost records would be
consistent with this intent.51
These limitations on when the GAO may have access to
records, however, are of little relevance to the question of which
records the GAO may inspect. First, limiting inspection to negoti-
ated contracts is consistent with the fact that the impetus behind
Id. (brackets in original).
47 Id.
48 See supra note 46 and accompanying text. This issue is discussed further infra at
notes 71-96 and accompanying text.
49 10 U.S.C. § 2313(b) (1976); 41 U.S.C. § 254(c) (1976).
80 41 C.F.R. § 1-16.901-32 (1981) (§ 10 of standard form contract prescribing examina-
tion of records by Comptroller General).
61 In SmithKline Corp. v. Staats, 668 F.2d 204, 211 (3d Cir. 1981), petition for cert.
filed sub nom. Bowsher v. SmithKline Corp., 50 U.S.L.W. 3936 (U.S. May 10, 1982) (No. 81-
2082), the court recited these limiting provisions and, just before concluding that the GAO
could have access primarily to allocated cost records, expressed its belief that it was not
"free to ignore these limitations in trying to assure that GAO has meaningful access to the
contractors' records." See generally supra note 10.
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the statute was a problem involving contract renegotiation.52 This
limitation may well reflect a belief that negotiated contracts pose a
greater risk of abuse because they are not checked by competitive
bidding.5 3 Second, the three-year limit was adopted to indicate to
contractors how long they had to retain the pertinent records.5 4
Third, although the $10,000 limit was not imposed by Congress15
and thus is not a binding interpretation of the statute, it provides
a sensible way for the GAO to allocate scarce manpower.5 6 Finally,
although these provisions limit the GAO's investigatory powers,
they do so by limiting the contracts that are subject to inquiry; not
by restricting the related records to which the GAO may have ac-
cess. It is perhaps more consistent with this sort of targeted in-
quiry, therefore, to allow an in-depth investigation of all "signifi-
cant inputs" than to limit the investigation solely to allocated
costs.
B. Procurement Study
Supporters of the access-to-records statute intended that the
statute be used to collect information about contractors and indus-
tries to help improve government procurement practices.57 The
study of government procurement policy is still in its infancy,58
and its growth is essential to the improvement of spending prac-
tices. 59 Although all courts addressing the scope of GAO access to
records have agreed on this point, 0 the competing judicial defini-
tions of "directly pertinent" will have substantially different ef-
fects on the GAO's ability to fulfill this purpose.
The allocated/unallocated test, as applied in the pharmaceuti-
cals cases, could strip the GAO of the ability to achieve the stat-
ute's investigatory purposes because some of the cost data with-
held are vital to the proper functioning of a GAO audit. For
example, the prices the government has agreed to pay for
pharmaceuticals have been based on the companies' "civilian" cat-
alogue prices.6 1 Among the unallocated pharmaceutical costs that
52 See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
11 See 97 CONG. REC. 13,198 (1951) (remarks of Rep. Hardy).
54 Id. at 13,199 (remarks of Rep. Burton).
o See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
97 CONG. REC. at 13,198 (remarks of Rep. Hardy) (scarce GAO manpower).
'7 See supra notes 37-41 and accompanying text.
's See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 1, at 2-8 (1977).
o5 Id. at 9-12.
,0 See, e.g., SmithKline Corp. v. Staats, 668 F.2d at 214.
1, See supra note 35.
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could be excluded from GAO scrutiny are "marketing and promo-
tion" costs,62 which presumably include the costs of advertising
and sales calls to physicians and hospitals, distribution of samples,
attendance at medical conventions, and other traditional market-
ing devices. It seems reasonable that the government, as a special
customer,63 may not be the target of some or any of these activi-
ties. Further, the government may not believe it should have to
pay a share of these "civilian" marketing costs. Yet under the allo-
cated/unallocated test, the GAO would be unable to gather the
data necessary to develop an informed policy in this area.6
Courts and commentators have argued that the allocated/un-
allocated test nevertheless is required by the statute because when
unallocated costs are related to several contracts, they are not di-
rectly pertinent to any one contract: only a fraction of any unallo-
cated cost category is borne by each contract.6 5 The facts of the
drug cases, however, suggest the opposite conclusion. Although the
government's contracts were among a larger group of contracts
that benefitted from pooled expenditures, the unallocated costs not
disclosed arguably were directly pertinent because they accounted
for ninety-one percent of the sales price in each government con-
tract.6 That the manufacturer chose not to allocate the costs
among products or contracts does not mean that they are unallo-
cable, and it should not diminish the direct relevance of the data
to several contracts.6 7 By itself, failure to allocate costs should not
be permitted to prevent meaningful procurement studies.6
2 Bristol Laboratories Div. of Bristol-Myers Co. v. Staats, 428 F. Supp. 1388, 1390
(S.D.N.Y. 1977), af/d per curiam, 620 F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1980), af/'d mem. by an evenly di-
vided court, 451 U.S. 400 (1981).
13 The fact that the contracts are negotiated indicates that the government is not buy-
ing in a competitive market. See supra note 4.
4 This example is, of course, merely illustrative. One might also consider how the Bris-
tol rule would affect the GAO's ability to monitor the "cost-shifting" of a contractor with
both a fixed-price and a cost-plus contract, as noted in the legislative history. See supra
note 39. These and other legislative purposes would all be stymied by a narrow construction
of the statute. Even the SmithKline court conceded the limiting effect of its holding on
monitoring industry pricing practices. SmithKline Corp. v. Staats, 668 F.2d at 213 & n.8.
" See, e.g., SmithKline Corp., 668 F.2d at 211; Note, supra note 13, at 132.
66 See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
67 Cf. Exxon Corp. v. Department of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207, 221 (1980) (company's
internal accounting system not binding on state for tax purposes); Bristol Laboratories Div.
of Bristol-Myers Co. v. Staats, 428 F. Supp. at 1391 ("the issue should not depend entirely
on a contractor's bookkeeping method").
6 See Merck & Co. v. Staats, 665 F.2d 1236, 1247 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (Mikva, J., concur-
ring in part, dissenting in part), cert. granted sub nom. Bowsher v. Merck & Co., 102 S. Ct.
1968 (1982); Reply Memorandum for Petitioners on petition for Certiorari at 7, Staats v.
Bristol Laboratories Div. of Bristol-Myers Co., 620 F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1980), af/'d mem. by an
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In contrast to the allocated/unallocated test, the significant in-
puts test is more responsive to the statute's investigatory purposes.
The GAO is interested in monitoring expenditures of public funds,
and these expenditures result directly from all of the cost compo-
nents, allocated or not, in the government's contract price. Rather
than relying for its limits on the contractor's potentially unrealistic
or atypical accounting allocation scheme, 9 the significant inputs
test allows access to data on all costs that have a significant effect
on the government's price, and it thereby permits the wide-ranging
studies contemplated by the statute's sponsors."0
C. Government Snooping
During the floor debate in the House, the access-to-records bill
was amended to limit GAO access to "directly" pertinent records.7 1
It is an elementary rule of statutory construction that effect be
given to every word in a statute "so that no part will be inoperative
or superfluous." 72 Similarly, a sponsor's statement of purpose is
usually to be considered an indication of congressional intent.73 It
is not controversial, therefore, that the clause should be construed
in a way that will serve the sponsor's purpose of preventing
"snooping" by the government. 4 The further conclusion of some
courts that this purpose is best served by limiting GAO access pri-
marily to allocated cost data75 is controversial.
The argument in favor of the allocated/unallocated test based
evenly divided court, 451 U.S. 400 (1981). See generally GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
supra note 22, at 4-24 to 4-25 (setting out general purposes for GAO contract audits).
'o See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
70 Similarly, the two tests would have different people deciding whether records are
directly pertinent since most cases will not be brought to court. If the allocated/unallocated
test is used, contractors, through their accounting practices, will have greater influence in
determining the pertinence of records; if significant inputs is used, the government will have
greater influence.
7 See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
72 2A J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46.06 (C. Sands 4th ed.
1973).
73 E.g., Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 63 (1980); Simpson v. United States, 435
U.S. 6, 13 (1978).
"' See supra note 46 and accompanying text. But cf. Shnitzer, supra note 35, at 308:
The degree to which the addition of the word "directly" may limit right of access is
problematical. It is difficult offhand to visualize a record which is pertinent but not
directly pertinent. Pertinency in this sense may be similar to pregnancy in that the
condition is essentially the same regardless of the preceding modifier.
"I See SmithKline Corp. v. Steats, 668 F.2d 201, 211-12 (3d Cir. 1981), petition for cert.
filed sub nom. Bowsher v. SmithKline Corp., 50 U.S.L.W. 3936 (U.S. May 10, 1982) (No. 81-
2082); see also Bristol Laboratories Div. of Bristol-Myers Co. v. Staats, 428 F. Supp. at
1390-91.
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on the Hoffman amendment is that the added word, "directly,"
must be given meaning: only direct cost data should be accessible.
Because all allocated costs are directly attributable to the contract
and unallocated costs are not, "directly" should be defined almost
exclusively as "allocated. '7 6 Moreover, in the case of the drug com-
panies, if the GAO is allowed access to records concerning all costs
that affect the government's price, the companies would be "re-
quired to make available virtually all [corporate] books and
records, because although it is impossible to trace the use of gov-
ernment dollars, those dollars contribute to the fund from which
all of the company's expenses are paid."'7 In such circumstances,
"directly" would impose no limit on the GAO, a result contrary to
the limiting intent of the sponsor. If Congress had intended "to
allow such unusual and unfettered government inspection of...
business records, it would have done so explicitly. 7 8
Although this argument has some plausibility, it loses much
force in the face of the House's defeat of another amendment
designed to prevent similar consequences for "a supplier of mate-
rial to a primary contractor[, which supplier] is not a subcontrac-
tor. 7 9 The amendment would have exempted such suppliers from
the access requirements.8 " The sponsor of the amendment, Repre-
sentative Harvey, described the situation that he thought the bill
would allow and that the amendment would prevent:
Some little contractor or manufacturer who may be using only
10 percent of his capacity for the production of goods for the
prime contractor, but because of that-and he cannot afford
to keep a separate set of books for that 10 percent-it means
that every section of his books will have to come under the
complete scrutiny of the GAO."'
The bill's sponsor, Representative Hardy, acknowledged that the
bill would permit such inspections, but because of limited GAO re-
sources, he did not anticipate that the GAO "could possibly go into
all of these things."82 If the GAO had reason to look into the sup-
plier's records, however, he wanted them to be able to do so, and
16 See cases cited supra note 75. See also supra note 10.
1' Bristol Laboratories Div. of Bristol-Myers Co. v. Staats, 428 F. Supp. at 1390.
78 Id.
' 97 CONG. REC. 13,376 (1951) (amendment offered by Rep. Harvey); see also id. at
13,377 (amendment defeated 83-69).
o Id. at 13,376.
" Id. (remarks of Rep. Harvey).
82 Id. at 13,377 (remarks of Rep. Hardy).
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under the bill "they would have the right to do it." 3 The amend-
ment was rejected, the short colloquy on Hoffman's anti-snooping
amendment followed, and Hoffman's amendment was accepted.s
That the Harvey amendment was rejected just before Hoff-
man's amendment was accepted suggests that the "snooping" to be
avoided was not that which Harvey's amendment was meant to
prevent. Harvey sought to preclude the sort of situation presumed
to justify the allocated/unallocated test in the drug cases: a com-
pany forced to disclose virtually all its records to the GAO because
it was unable to keep separate books for data related to a govern-
ment contract.8 5 If anything, Harvey's example provides a more
compelling argument for nondisclosure than do the drug cases: the
companies Harvey was concerned about were only suppliers to pri-
mary contractors, not general contractors or even subcontractors;
in the pharmaceuticals cases, the records belong to primary con-
tractors. In a suitable case, Congress was willing to subject all of a
supplier's records to GAO scrutiny.88 It is hard to imagine that it
was any less willing to allow GAO access to the records of a pri-
mary contractor.
In this context, "directly pertinent" has a different signifi-
cance. Hoffman apparently had little attachment to the word "di-
rectly"; although "directly" was "not all that it should be, it was
the best he could think of . . . .I was rather forced to accept it
.... )Y87 "Directly" was added not for its own peculiar meaning,
but to import the antisnooping concern.88 Snooping connotes sly or
sneaky prying into matters not subject to legitimate inquiry., In-
deed, the House may have accepted the Hoffman amendment to
ensure that the GAO would inspect records only for legitimate pur-
poses. Given a legitimate purpose, it was intended that the GAO
have access to all records necessary to make a meaningful study.
The Harvey amendment apparently was rejected" precisely be-
cause it could have made "it impossible frequently to obtain infor-
83 Id.
4Id.
as Compare supra text accompanying note 81 with supra text accompanying notes 77-
78.
:6 See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
87 97 CONG. REc. at 13,377 (remarks of Rep. Hoffman).
a See id. ("The purpose is to limit the 'snooping' that may be carried on under this bill
89 To "snoop" is defined as "[t]o appropriate ... in a clandestine manner," or "[t]o go
around in a sly or prying manner." 9 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 327 (1933) (emphasis in
original).
0 See supra notes 79-84 and accompanying text.
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mation which would be vital in a [legitimate] study of a
contract." 91
It is not necessary to adopt the allocated/unallocated test to
make "directly" serve a limiting function. It may well be snooping
(and therefore improper), for example, for the GAO to invoke the
access clause to investigate a corporation's or industry's compli-
ance with the corporate disclosure requirements of the federal se-
curities laws,92 even if the requested data concern only allocated
costs that would also be relevant to a study of a negotiated con-
tract. It would not be snooping, however, for the GAO to collect
data, whether on allocated or unallocated costs, if these would en-
hance a study designed to improve government procurement
practices.9 3
The significant inputs test is able to accommodate both the
investigatory purposes and the snooping concerns of the access
statute. The test focuses on the relevance of the requested data to
the government contract and on the relation of the GAO study to
the purposes of the statute.94 It would prevent "fishing trips," such
as the securities law investigation hypothesized, but it would per-
mit meaningful pursuit of what all courts have agreed is a legiti-
mate study of the pharmaceuticals industry.9 5 The test should not
be rejected because it might require disclosure of virtually all the
9' 97 CONG. REc. at 13,376 (remarks of Rep. Hardy concerning the Harvey amendment).
Judge Mikva drew a similar conclusion from Rep. Hoffman's remarks concerning the Harvey
amendment: "Representative Hoffman feared ... that GAO would inspect direct costs of
production ... even when the production was not relevant to government procurement at
all." Merck & Co. v. Staats, 665 F.2d 1236, 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (Mikva, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part), cert. granted sub nom. Bowsher v. Merck & Co., 102 S. Ct. 1968
(1982). Cf. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Staats, 574 F.2d 904, 916 n.8 (7th Cir.) ("Attempting to cull the
meaning of the word 'snooping' from other comments by Congressman Hoffman . . . is a
difficult task because the Congressman voiced so many concerns that there is no logical way
to identify which one or ones he regarded as the 'snooping' that he sought to limit."), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 959 (1978).
92 See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 77f-77k, 771-77r (1976).
Conceivably, therefore, the GAO's requests in the drug cases were unsupportable be-
cause they were made for the improper purpose of aiding the Senate inquiry. If that were so,
then none of the data, not just the unallocated cost data, should have been accessible. The
argument of improper purpose was advanced in some of the drug cases, but the courts re-
jected it. The GAO's own purpose was to study wastefulness in procurement and as such
was legitimate; "[t]hat United States senators encourage and influence GAO to use its pow-
ers to the fullest extent allowed by law, and that GAO heeds those senators, is irrelevant."
SmithKline Corp., 668 F.2d at 207; see also Merck & Co. v. Staats, 665 F.2d at 1239-42
(Mikva, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Staats, 574 F.2d at 907-
12. But see Case Comment, supra note 4, at 1151-53, 1159 (arguing that court should have
found improper purpose in Eli Lilly & Co.); Note, supra note 13, at 125-30 (same).
" See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Staats, 574 F.2d at 914-16.
" See supra note 93.
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records of the drug companies; when the end is legitimate, Con-
gress apparently found extensive disclosure to be a tolerable inves-
tigatory tool, not intolerable government snooping.96
D. Corporate Confidentiality
Just as Congress was concerned with snooping, contractors
subject to the access statute may be concerned that government
access to their records will imperil confidential and proprietary
business information.9 7 This concern will be present regardless of
which of the current standards for "directly pertinent" is adopted.
There is no avoiding the fact that the statute gives the governnient
the power to inspect records that contractors may well prefer to
keep secret.
Because the significant inputs test would expose more records
to the GAO, however, and because these might include records
from highly proprietary areas, such as research and development,98
it may be less desirable than the allocated/unallocated test. Only
the Seventh Circuit, which created the significant inputs test in Eli
Lilly & Co. v. Staats,99 has addressed the confidentiality problem
directly.100 The court dismissed the contractor's concerns because
the GAO had indicated its intention not to identify the source of
any information, to give data only to appropriate congressional
bodies, and to notify Lilly before it disclosed any information. 01
Confident that the GAO was "properly cognizant of plaintiff's need
for confidentiality,' ' 0 2 the Seventh Circuit instructed the district
court to include these confidentiality guarantees in its order on re-
mand granting GAO access.103
In principle, such protective orders ought to be sufficient.
Courts are capable of evaluating and protecting claims of confiden-
tiality, as is demonstrated by their regularly handling requests
" See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
97 See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Staats, 574 F.2d at 917.
" See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Staats, 574 F.2d at 908 (noting district court's concern "that
the records sought by the Comptroller General contain confidential business information
and secrets of plaintiff which, if made public, would cause plaintiff irrevocable competitive
injury"). See also Note, supra note 13, at 136.
" 574 F.2d 904 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 959 (1978).
00 Id. at 917.
:O Id.
,o2 Id.
1o3 Id. at 918. See also Merck & Co. v. Staats, 665 F.2d 1236, 1239 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
(Mikva, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (district court had added "protective con-
ditions" to its order granting access), cert. granted sub nom. Bowsher v. Merck & Co., 102 S.
Ct. 1968 (1982).
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under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c) for protection from
discovery."0 If in practice such protective orders are not fully sat-
isfactory, 0 5 it is not a result of the significant inputs test.0 8
IV. THE NEED FOR CERTAINTY
The significant inputs test allows for the sort of procurement
studies contemplated by the access statute's sponsors without
jeopardizing their intention not to facilitate government snooping
and without unreasonably risking compromise of corporate confi-
dentiality. Some courts have criticized the test, however, for im-
posing an unfairly indefinite obligation on government contrac-
tors.10 7 Reasonably certain identification of the records to which
the GAO will have access is important for three reasons: to allow
the contractor to weigh the disclosure responsibilities in his negoti-
ations and performance, to provide the GAO with a fair estimate of
its available data sources, and to avoid lengthy litigation. These
needs are accommodated no better by the allocated/unallocated
test than by the significant inputs test.
A. Certainty and the Allocated/Unallocated Test
The majority position concerning GAO access was articulated
104 See, e.g., Keyes v. Lenoir Rhyne College, 552 F.2d 579, 581 (4th Cir. 1977) (refusing
to order production of confidential faculty records in employment discrimination case), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 904 (1977); Brink v. DaLesio, 82 F.R.D. 664, 676-78 (D. Md. 1979) (refusing
to lift judicial seal on documents in grand jury's possession); Financial Gen. Bankshares,
Inc. v. Lance, 80 F.R.D. 22, 22-23 (D.D.C. 1978) (refusing to grant protective order). See
also C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, 8 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2043 (1970) (discussing
protective orders and confidential business information). Cf. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Staats, 574
F.2d at 916 ("it is likely that the Government could compel the same disclosures from plain-
tiff in discovery proceedings even in litigation in which plaintiff is not a participant" (cita-
tion omitted)).
10' For example, confidentiality is not always guaranteed by not identifying the source
of data. Indeed, much information may be distinctive enough to be "self-identifying," par-
ticularly to those familiar with the industry (who of course pose the greatest competitive
danger). Also, the limitation of disclosure to authorized members of Congress and congres-
sional committees may be of little comfort to a contractor: the expressed intent of some
members of Congress to publicize drug company data precipitated this litigation. Eli Lilly &
Co. v. Staats, 574 F.2d at 921-24 (district court's summary judgment reprinted as appendix
to dissenting opinion of Pell, J.).
I" Whichever test is used, the GAO might add stronger confidentiality guarantees to
the standard form government contract. See 41 C.F.R. § 1-16.901-32 (1981). A contractor
concerned about confidentiality also might be able to have greater protective language in-
cluded in its particular contract.
107 See, e.g., SmithKline Corp. v. Staats, 668 F.2d 201, 212 (3d Cir. 1981), petition for
cert. filed sub nom. Bowsher v. SmithKline Corp., 50 U.S.L.W. 3936 (U.S. May 10, 1982)
(No. 81-2082).
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first by the District Court for the Southern District of New York in
Bristol Laboratories Division of Bristol-Myers Co. v. Staats.10 8
The court agreed to limit access to the cost categories, primarily
reflecting allocated costs, that Bristol Laboratories had offered to
disclose.10 9 Later courts have adopted Bristol Laboratories' listing
of cost categories that must be disclosed,110 so the test gives the
appearance of certainty.
The appearance of certainty in the pharmaceuticals cases is a
result of the fact that all of the cases involved contracts for compa-
rable products in the same industry. But the federal government
procures products from a wide array of industries with highly va-
ried cost structures.111 If the limits to GAO access derived in the
pharmaceuticals cases were applied in other industries, certainty
might result, but the data produced would not necessarily bear any
relation to the data that are directly pertinent to the contract in-
volved. Moreover, the cost records made available because allo-
cated in the drug industry might not actually be allocated in the
industry in question. A strict application of the allocated/unallo-
cated test as applied in the pharmaceuticals cases, therefore, could
lead to one or both of two absurd results: it could produce data not
relevant to the inquiry, and it could produce data on unallocated
costs in proportions far beyond those contemplated in Bristol
Laboratories.1 1 2
These problems could be resolved in any of several ways. First,
the test could be modified to require access to cost data that the
contractor has actually allocated to the government's contract.
This would produce perfect certainty for the contractor, for he will
always know which of his costs are allocated, but it would produce
perfect uncertainty for the government, because the government
would not be able to ascertain the records to which it would have
access until after a contract has been signed. Moreover, contractors
with similar cost structures could be treated differently simply be-
cause they have different accounting practices, something wholly
irrelevant to the pertinence of the records to the government
108 428 F. Supp. 1388 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd per curiam, 620 F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1980),
aff'd mem. by an evenly divided court, 451 U.S. 400 (1981).
:o9 Id. at 1391. See also supra note 10.
11H See, e.g., SmithKline Corp. v. Staats, 668 F.2d at 212-13.
I See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 1, at 13 ("Procurement" includes "all
purchases by Federal Agencies that range from standard commercial supplies and services
to the most complex national systems, such as defense weapons ... and space systems.");
supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text.
"Iz See generally supra note 10.
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contract."13
Second, the courts, the GAO, or the Congress could fabricate
feasible cost allocations on an industry-by-industry basis. 14 Al-
lowing access to records that may feasibly be allocated-even if not
actually allocated-would produce certainty for contractors and
the GAO, but this also would be an inadequate solution. To create
such industry standards would require access to precisely the data
that are at issue. Further, creating the standards would be a diffi-
cult and time-consuming endeavor. It is difficult to justify develop-
ing reasonable standards for cost allocation instead of developing
more explicit definitions of "directly pertinent . . . records."
The third resolution would be to determine which general cost
categories are directly pertinent to government contract studies on
an industry-by-industry basis. Contractors and the GAO could
each use these determinations to predict which records would have
to be made available under a proposed contract. Whatever cer-
tainty this might produce would be due not to the allocated/unal-
located criteria, however, but to the new tests of direct pertinence.
Moreover, once the focus reverts to criteria of direct pertinence,
there is no reason to limit the inquiry to allocated costs. The same
tests of direct pertinence could also be applied to unallocated costs
with equal certainty.
B. Certainty and Significant Inputs
The significant inputs test is not much more definite than the
allocated/unallocated test. All that is certain, based on the cases to
date, is that data concerning ninety percent of the contract price
are significant." 5 The courts have not been called upon to deter-
mine how much less than ninety percent is still significant. A con-
tractor contemplating selling goods to the government, therefore,
cannot be certain which records he may have to expose to the gov-
See generally supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
"4 It may be that this is what the Bristol court intended when it promulgated its rule,
but if so it gives no guidance to courts considering GAO access to records in other indus-
tries: the Bristol court without explanation capitulated to the constraints on disclosure sug-
gested by Bristol Laboratories. See supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text. Moreover, at
least one court that followed Bristol did so because "Congress intended the words [directly
pertinent] to acquire some common meaning," SmithKline Corp. v. Staats, 668 F.2d 201,
212 (3d Cir. 1981), petition for cert. filed sub nom. Bowsher v. SmithKline, 50 U.S.L.W.
3936 (U.S. May 10, 1982) (No. 81-2082), which suggests that it would apply the Bristol test
to other industries.
"' See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Staats, 574 F.2d 904, 913-14 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
959 (1978).
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ernment until he signs a contract and faces a specific request, and
the GAO cannot be sure of its data resources until it receives ei-
ther data from the contractor or an adverse ruling from the courts.
The significant inputs test would be made more certain if ad
hoc limits were placed on the percentage of costs still considered
significant, but ad hoc limits are inconsistent with the statutory
concept of a test of relevance or direct pertinence of the records to
the government's contract.11 The test could be made more certain
through judicial refinement, but this is a lengthy process. As with
the allocated/unallocated test, the significant inputs test could be
made more certain if either Congress or the GAO were to establish
fixed guidelines to determine what sorts of records are "directly
pertinent. 117
C. GAO Guidelines
Both the allocated/unallocated and significant inputs tests
would be improved by GAO guidelines designed to determine
which records may be considered directly pertinent under the stat-
ute. The GAO can promulgate such guidelines as part of its regula-
tions concerning government standard-form contracts.11 8 The
GAO's expertise in procurement audits is required for that task,
and the GAO may be assisted through voluntary data disclosure by
government contractors. 19 Although proposing specific guidelines
is beyond the scope of this comment, some general observations
may be helpful.
The GAO's guidelines should consist of industry-based listings
of standard cost categories. For each cost category within each in-
dustry, the GAO should set a percentage of total contract costs
above which records concerning those costs would have to be made
1"e Cf. supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
"7 It is not clear, however, that such guidelines could be enforced if the Supreme Court
should adopt the allocated/unallocated test: if a contractor is able to shield more records
from government scrutiny under the allocated/unallocated test than under new GAO guide-
lines, and if the Court has explicitly adopted the former, the contractor will be unlikely to
comply with more demanding GAO guidelines. Having determined that allocated cost data
are a fair approximation of "directly pertinent" records, the Court would be hard pressed to
require more. Even if the Court should opt for the allocated/unallocated test, therefore, it
ought to leave some flexibility in its opinion to allow the GAO to write guidelines that would
improve the test.
Its Standard Form 32, listing the general provisions for government supply contracts, is
found at 41 C.F.R. § 1-16.901-32 (1981). Clauses 10(b) and 10(c) contain the same "directly
pertinent" language found in the 1951 access statute. Id.
" See generally supra note 27.
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available to the GAO. 120 It is conceivable that the GAO would have
to develop cost categories on a basis smaller than an entire indus-
try if the products of the industry are sufficiently diverse.
The GAO should evaluate as many factors as possible in set-
ting the levels of cost significance. For example, the average size of
government contracts in a given industry might be relevant. In an
industry where government contracts have always been measured
in millions of dollars, costs representing a small percentage of the
total contract price might still be considered "significant" and ac-
cessible, although the same percentage would be insignificant in an
industry where the average contract size is under $100,000.
Similarly, the GAO should consider the need for procurement
studies and the degree of detail required to make the studies
meaningful. 121 In an industry from which the government has only
recently begun purchasing items, for example, detailed studies of
costs and procurement options could produce great economies for
the government and might justify 'setting a low figure as the
threshold for significant inputs, allowing the GAO access to larger
amounts of relevant information.
Another factor to consider in formulating numerical defini-
tions of "significant inputs" is the cost that detailed government
study might impose on contractors. If, for example, a very low
threshold were set in an industry where the government had multi-
million-dollar contracts, the costs to the contractor of disclosing
records on all phases of production might be large. In such a case,
a higher percentage might be proper.122
Similarly, the risk of improper use or disclosure of proprietary
or confidential information should be considered in formulating
the guidelines. For example, if a particular cost category is likely to
include confidential information, the GAO might set a higher
120 One way to amend the standard form contract, see supra note 118, would be to
retain the "directly pertinent" language in clause 10 and add a definition of that phrase in
clause 1, the definitions clause. A new clause might be added to provide: "The term 'directly
pertinent books, records, etc.' means all cost records except those which, taken singly, com-
prise less than X% of the contract price." An appended table could provide a list of figures
to be substituted for X, depending on the industry and type of contract involved.
121 Cf. supra notes 57-70 and accompanying text.
2 The debate on the Harvey amendment, see supra notes 79-86 and accompanying
text, supports considering the costs imposed by disclosure. Representative Harvey's motiva-
tion was in part to reduce such costs. Representative Hardy, the sponsor of the access bill,
acknowledged that GAO access might be costly, but he pointed out that the GAO's re-
sources are limited, and he expressed his belief that the GAO would undertake a study only
when it had a reasonable expectation that the study would produce benefits sufficient to
offset the costs to the GAO and the contractors. 97 CONG. REc. 13,376-77 (1951).
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threshold for the category to ensure that access is necessary and
that the value of GAO access outweighs whatever harms disclosure
risks. In addition, the GAO should provide some form of confiden-
tiality guarantee in the standard-form contract regulations.123
Although this discussion has not been exhaustive, it is indica-
tive of how the GAO might be able to formulate guidelines to pro-
mote certainty for the agency and for contractors. These guidelines
would permit meaningful procurement studies and help ensure eq-
uitable treatment of contractors.
CONCLUSION
Determination of the proper scope of the GAO's access to a
government contractor's records requires a balancing of the inter-
ests of the government against those of the contractor. The govern-
ment's interest, clearly shown in the legislative history of the ac-
cess statute, is to provide the GAO with the tools it needs to
review both the propriety of individual procurement contracts and
the functioning of the procurement process in general. The con-
tractor's interests include freedom from excessive government
snooping into primarily civilian business matters, protection of
confidential business data, and certainty in the scope of GAO
access.
This comment has shown that the significant inputs standard
of access, strengthened by GAO guidelines, best achieves a balance
of these interests. Unlike the competing allocated/unallocated
standard, "significant inputs" is fully responsive to the purposes of
the access-to-records legislation. It surmounts the narrow confines
of the pharmaceuticals industry dispute to provide a definition
more generally applicable to government procurement.
Howard S. Lanznar
Michael A. Lindsay
"3 See supra notes 97-106 and accompanying text.
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